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PRIVATIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: PANACEA FOR THE ECONOMIC ILLS




The political breakdown in the Soviet Union followed by the fall of
socialist governments throughout Eastern Europe led to a clarion call of free
enterprise over Socialism, and served as a "rubber stamp" of approval of
the many liberal economic policies which had already been in
experimentation in many parts of the developing world.' As economic
"bankruptcy" has forced many of the developing countries to adopt
structural adjustment measures imposed by major lender organizations, the
failure of the Soviet and Socialist systems in Eastern Europe may have
caused international economists to confidently imbue those structural
adjustment programs with "conditionality" requirements that gradually
came to include more and more liberal economic policies. One such
conditionality requirement that has become increasingly prevalent is the
incorporation of privatization programs. Indeed, privatization has
increasingly become a component of conditionality requirements attached
to institutional lending particularly in least-developed countries (LDCs). 2
1. For a critique of the general optimism concerning the "perceived" triumph of
capitalism over socialism, see Robert Heilbroner, Reflections: The Triumph of Capitalism,
THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 23, 1989, at 98. Heilbroner implies that the search for an
alternative to capitalism did not die with the fall of the Socialist Republics. "I doubt
whether the historical drama will conclude, like a great morality play, in the unequivocal
victory of one side and the ignominious defeat of the other. The economic enemy of
capitalism has been its own self-generated dynamics, not the presence of an alternative
economic system."
2. CHRISTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24-25 (1992).
233
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
For example, seventy percent of structural adjustment loans and forty
percent of sectoral adjustment loans made by the World Bank during the
1980s contained a privatization component. 3 Privatization programs are
being promoted as an essential component of economic reform in all parts
of the developing world regardless of the level of economic, political and
social development. Further, these programs often contain sanctions for
non-compliance. For example, recently, the threat of suspending economic
recovery aid for failure to "quickly" implement a privatization program
sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was leveled at the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere-Haiti.4
Today, as this country is fighting to build the basis of a rudimentary
democracy, it is also struggling to recover from a three year economic
embargo that has devastated its already flailing economy. 5 As has been
reported by the press, threats to revoke aid to Haiti have focused
particularly on the privatization component even after the government had
made some progress in accepting the bitter structural adjustment programs
already imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.
6
3. Paul Cook and Colin Kirkpatrick, Privatization Policy and Performance, in
PRIVATISATION POLICY AND PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 15 (Paul
Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick eds., 1995).
4. The IMF and other donor organizations denied Haiti $100 Million when Haiti's
cabinet rejected a budget proposal that included a framework for privatization of nine
state-run companies. Nicole Winfield, Haitian, U.S. Officials Reassure Potential Investors,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 8, 1995.
5. Id. Bernard Aristide, the democratically elected President of Haiti, was overthrown
seven months into his governance in September 1991. To punish the coup leaders, the
international community led by the OAS (Organization of American States) imposed an
economic embargo on Haiti which forbade any commercial links between Haiti and the
rest of the world. President Aristide was returned on October 15, 1994 with the help of
U.N. and American forces. The deal struck for the return of Aristide, was that the new
constitutional government would have to accept structural adjustment measures as well as
a privatization program. Upon his return to the Presidential palace, Aristide found it
difficult to accept these conditions given the economic ravages caused by the embargo.
An already flailing economy in 1991 was brought to its brink.
6. Indeed many believed that part of the conditions for President Aristide's return to
Haiti was based on an acceptance of the privatization programs. In a Nov. 29 letter to
Aristide, Reps. Dan Burton (R-Ind.) and Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.), ranking members
of the House subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, threatened more aid cuts. "We
want to state in the strongest possible terms that ... unless your government stops its
incitement to violence and fulfills its commitment to carry out extensive privatization,
continued U.S. assistance to Haiti will become extremely difficult .... Even the massive
fees you pay various lobbyists will not enable you to overcome a bipartisan determination
to stand up for U.S. principles and to support the commitments which you agreed to when
we sent our troops to Haiti to return you to power." Douglas Farah, Doubt Cast on Haiti's
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The exigency for the institution of privatization programs in Haiti
follows a general trend which has already taken hold in most of the
developing world. 7 The appeal of privatization in these countries is a
related result of the macroeconomic burden that relatively large public
enterprise sectors have historically imposed on these countries' economies. 8
Indeed, these enterprises are seen as an important contributory factor to
mounting fiscal imbalances. 9 In addition, the fact that most of these public
enterprises account for a large proportion of the international borrowing of
these countries, escalating debt obligations have made the efficiency of these
enterprises a great concern.' 0 Yet in spite of the growing concern over the
draining economic impact of public sectors in the developing world, the
state sectors in developing countries remain large. 1' Most privatizations in
terms of number and value have occurred principally in the industrialized
economies. There are also some regional differences in the extent to
which privatization programs have been implemented in the developing
Chance to Rise from Poverty; Lagging Privatization Program Holds Up Foreign Aid and
Discourages Investors, THE WASH. POST, December 7, 1995, at A39.
7. Developing countries' share of world privatization sales rose from 6% in 1988 to
42% in 1992. See Cook & Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 5.
8. Cook & Kirkpatrick explain that policy objectives and motives for privatization have
been different between industrialized nations and the developing world. The former
turned to privatization based on ideology and the yearning for increased economic
efficiency. Developing countries, on the other hand, were motivated and pushed to
privatize due to the extreme macroeconomic imbalances related to large inefficient public
sectors. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. The World Bank reported "that by the late 1970s public enterprises accounted for
one-third of all international borrowing by developing countries ... (World Bank, 1980)."
Id. For an account on how heavy borrowing to finance state enterprises became a primary
factor contributing to the Latin American debt crisis, see Enrique R. Carrasco, Chile, Its
Foreign Commercial Bank Creditors and Its Vulnerable Groups. An Assessment of the
Cooperative Case-by-Case Approach to the Debt Crisis, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273,
274 (1993)
11. THE WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 25 (1995). "Although most of the increase (of state owned
enterprises in the 80s) was due to the explosion of privatization activity in the transition
economics of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the number of divestitures increased more
than four-fold in Latin America and more than three-fold in the rest of Asia." Id. at 26-
27.
12. The greatest privatizations in terms of number and value of sales occurred in the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Spain and Italy. During the period 1988-92
seventy-four percent of privatizations (by value) occurred in the industrialized world.
Cook & Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 5-6 tbl. 1.2.
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world. Though the developing countries' share of world privatization sales
rose steadily each year from six percent in 1988 to forty-two percent in
1992, the sharpest increase occurred in the South American economies,
whose share rose from six percent in 1988 to thirty-three percent in 1992.13
"In contrast, privatization in sub-Saharan Africa has been relatively small
as compared to South America and Asia, and is largely accounted for by
transactions in South Africa in the final years of the 1980s."14 Actually,
privatization efforts have generally been concentrated within a few
countries. 15  For example, most of the privatizations recorded in Latin
America have occurred in Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. 6 In the
Caribbean area, Jamaica has been the most aggressive, accounting for most
of the privatizations in the region.17 Despite the increase in privatization
activities in the developing world the public sector has not diminished on
average in these economies and state-owned enterprises continue to be
prominent in the poorest countries."i Not surprisingly, the World Bank
reports that generally the poorer the country, the larger the relative size of
its public sector. 19 The average share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in
the economy has also remained constant, particularly in the lesser developed
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Adam, Cavendish and Mistry argue that privatizations will usually succeed and be
more prevalent in economies which have previously developed the proper economic
infrastructure, prior to privatization. See generally ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 70-95.
These authors minimize the short-term political constraints which have often been the
explanation for unsuccessful privatization programs in the developing world. See THE
WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 10-12 stressing 1) political desirability, 2) political
feasibility, and 3) political credibility, as the main predictors of private sector reform
readiness.
16. Cook & Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 5-7 tbl.1.3.
17. Since 1981, The Jamaican government has divested 200 entities. National
Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ) Annual Report 1991. On the other hand, Trinidad and
Tobago have espoused a privatization program since 1972, but since then, only five
enterprises have been privatized. ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 188-89. These authors
attribute Jamaica's relative privatization success to a more diversified economy. Id. at 70.
18. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 29-30, 32-33. "... the small number of
divestitures relative to the total number of SOE's (state-owned enterprises), the
concentration of sales in only a few countries, and the fact that the decline in the SOE
share of investment will only gradually reduce the size of SOE capital stock relative to the
rest of the economy all suggest that the mainframe of the SOE sector on average has
remained substantially unchanged in developing countries." Id. at 30.
19. Id. at 32-33.
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economies. 20 The report states that despite divestiture efforts, SOEs
continue to play an important role in developing economies. In addition,
and perhaps more importantly, where privatization has occurred, the sales
have not made a significant contribution to improving governments' fiscal
21position.
The constraints faced by developing economies in their efforts to
privatize is the primary subject of this paper. Much of the discourse on the
problems of privatization particularly in the developing world, has tended
to focus on the political constraints encountered in countries which have
grown accustomed to state interference in major economic sectors. But a
closer examination of the economic structures of these countries (and the
seminal issue of this article) reveals that perhaps the advocates of
privatization have failed to realize that this process may not bring the gains
expected particularly in poorer nations for precisely the same reasons that
have brought these countries to the economic crises they presently face.
Perhaps as long as developing economies face the same structural economic
problems that prompted increased state intervention, these new reform
measures may turn out to be no more effective than the "evil" they are
intended to remedy.
H. THE IDEOLOGIES FUELING THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE
Before we proceed in discussing the relative merits of the privatization
efforts in the developing world a definition of privatization needs to be
elaborated. The term privatization has been used to describe "an array of
actions designed to broaden the scope of private sector activity, or the
assimilation by the public sector of efficiency enhancing techniques
generally employed by the private sector." 22 This definition would entail
any reduction in the scale or scope of government with a concurrent
expansion of the scope of operation for private capital. 23 It would also
encompass all measures designed to reform the public sector in order to
render it more responsive to the economic development needs of the
20. Id. at 33.
21. "Revenue from privatization sales in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, countries
which were in the top five in gross proceeds from privatization during 1980-91 (World
Bank, 1992), had an insignificant impact in terms of reducing government budget
deficits." See Cook & Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 8.
22. ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
23. Ralph A. Young, Privatisation: African Perspectives, in PRIVATISATION POLICY
AND PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 162, 162 (Paul Cook & Colin
Kirkpatrick eds., 1995).
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country. However, in most of the literature on privatization in the
developing world, the focus has been on a narrower definition of
privatization, namely the transfer from the public to the private sector of
ownership and/or control of productive assets.24 This has been the
particular focus of privatization initiatives in the formally centrally-planned
economies of Central and Eastern Europe.25 There have been numerous
criticisms of this narrow definition of privatization in the formulation of
privatization programs in these latter countries. In fact, the narrow focus
on reducing the state sector without paying attention to the need for these
countries to concurrently redefine and in some aspects strengthen the role
of their public sectors has been harshly attacked.26
Such analyses should be no different in the case of developing
economies. Though the latter's state sectors have traditionally functioned
in a market economy and state planning may have not been as expansive as
in the former socialist countries, nonetheless the role of the state in shaping
these economies has been quite involved. The state in developing countries
has always been perceived by those governing and those governed as having
the central role of promoting economic growth and development.27 In the
traditional approach to the role of government, the state's role is to enter the
market economy solely to redress market imperfections.2" Ideally, the state
should invest only in public infrastructures that help promote private
24. Id. at 162-63.
25. For a critique of the privatization reform process in Central and Eastern Europe see
generally Ronald Daniels & Robert Howse, Reforming the Reform Process: A Critique of
Proposals for Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, 25 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL.
27 (1992).
26. See id. at 28, 30. (Criticizing the pace of privatization programs in the Newly
Liberalizing Economies (NLCs) for the lack of focus on the simultaneous strengthening
of public institutions, "Even if it were possible, massive privatization without the prior or
simultaneous creation of strong and legitimate public institutions and new social contracts
would be decidedly dangerous for political and social stability"). For similar arguments
see also Kent Klaudt, Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology and
the False Promise of the Free Market, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 303 (1995) and Lan Cao, The
Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 97 (1995).
27. See generally remarks by Maxwell 0. Chibundu, in The Shift in Markets: New
Movements in International Law Responding to Privatization, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 105, 119 (1993).
28. For a general discussion of the Neoclassical theory of government see MICHAEL
HOWARD, PUBLIC FINANCE IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES: THE CARIBBEAN ExPERIENCE 2-5
(1992).
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investment in productive sectors. 29  Neoclassical theory is primarily
concerned, however, with static efficiency in the allocation of resources.3 °
Many development economists have stressed that "although the pursuit of
economic efficiency is a legitimate goal of public policy in any modern
economy, social justice is an overriding concern of governments in poor
countries. The roles of poverty, human resource underdevelopment,
foreign exchange depletion, and high levels of unemployment in the calculus
of public sector decision making in poor countries are much more important
than in highly industrialized economies." 3 These roles of the state sector
cannot be wholly diminished. A proper definition of privatization in
developing economies should focus on the creation of a private sector
capable of participating in economic development and the simultaneous
fortification of a public sector capable of continuing its role as promoter of
economic development. The best way to do this is not altogether clear.
Indeed this is the crux of the ideological battle fueling the privatization
debates. Many countries faced with the prospect of privatization are not
opposed to the privatization programs per se. However, much of the
disagreement lies in the method and pace of implementation of privatization
programs. There have been several reports of rushed privatizations where
the potential benefits were lost, "and the final results may have been worse
than the situation before divestiture." 3 2 This was quoted from a review by
the World Bank itself which has expressed some criticisms regarding the
Bank's insistence on speedy privatization of state-run concerns in
developing countries. 33 This is a debate which has become of extreme
relevance as the push for privatizations continues throughout the developing
world. Much of these programs are perceived as being donor-driven and
there is much concern that many countries are not given enough flexibility
to adapt these programs to their particular development needs and economic
situations. 3 In addition there are concerns that the interest of the IMF in
29. J.-M. Fontaine & V. Geronimi, Private Investment and Privatisation in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in PRIVATISATION POLICY AND PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
139, 144 (Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick eds., 1995).
30. HOWARD, supra note 28, at 1.
31. Id.
32. Rose Umoren, Finance: Rushed Privatization Causes Loss in Benefits, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Oct. 30, 1995.
33. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 244. For example, The World Bank notes the
following countries as examples of countries which have pursued rushed and poorly
planned privatizations, "occasionally in response to externally imposed deadlines": Guinea
and Mali in Africa.
34. Many countries in the developing world have expressed concern about the lack of
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
improving short term budgetary deficits immediately, has resulted in the
IMF favoring immediate liquidations of state-owned enterprises over a
slower privatization process and public enterprise reform particularly in
least-developed economies.35 Those who oppose speedy privatizations
stress the need to force the proper political commitment and the
strengthening of macroeconomic structures prior to privatization. However,
the World Bank, and particularly bilateral aid agencies such as USAID,
generally tend to be very skeptical about programs aiming to restructure
economies or state-owned enterprises prior to privatization, citing the
difficulty in maintaining the right amount of political commitment over a
long period of time as the key problem with such efforts.36 Critics of these
positions caution these organizations from promoting privatization as an
ideological end of itself in the developing world. They argue that
privatization must be perceived as a means to an end in restructuring these
economies to better achieve their goals for economic development and
should not be viewed as simply the triumph of one economic ideology
(minimum state intervention) over the other (state planning).
The global trend towards privatization however is also serving to fuel
an economic ideology which has the danger of becoming a prescription
overused, particularly in the least developed economies. Indeed, today
some have intimated that an "international" norm for the legal framework
and implementation of the process of privatization may be emerging in
regions like Latin America.37 Privatization programs in countries like
autonomy over the directing of their domestic economic affairs. The Latin American
Economic System (SELA), an organization representing most Latin American and
Caribbean states which has been promoting cooperative regional efforts to improve
privatization programs in the region, issued a statement condemning the influence of the
powerful alliance between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and
the World Trade Organization. "These entities form a new Bermuda triangle, a triangle
so powerful that if we try to get across it without a compass, radar and map, we will be
lost." Humberto Marquez, Latin America-Finance: SELA Seeks Exit From "Bermuda
Triangle," INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 5, 1995.
35. Young, supra note 23, at 167.
36. "To wait for optimum circumstances in which all possible concerns are handled at
once is impractical, and can become a political excuse for inaction." INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE CORP., Preface to PRIVATIZATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1 (1995).
37. "... most countries in Latin America wishing to participate in World Bank and IMF
lending programs have been obligated by those institutions to enact a remarkably similar
set of reforms aiming toward free trade, liberalized foreign investment and diminished
governmental control of the national economy. Privatization of public enterprises is one
of the reforms that these lending sources have insisted upon... The legal framework and
implementation of the privatization process has tended to follow the model created by
240 [Vol. 18
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Chile, Argentina, and Mexico have been relatively aggressive and have
received the essential stamp of approval of the donor organizations.38 Will
there emerge an international standard? To what extent will smaller
developing countries be precluded from formulating tailor-made economic
development plans more attuned to their particular needs? Must they be
forced to adhere to an unproven formula merely because it is the
"intellectual darling" of modern day theorists?
HI. DEVELOPING NATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
The reality is that today many third-world nations find themselves in
a precarious state in an international order composed of foreign powers
which no longer view these countries as pawns in the great international
battle of ideologies (capitalism vs. communism)." These powers have
recently sought to withdraw the economic aid which in the past had
strategically been dispersed to help maintain the ideological stand-off.' As
a result, today most developing nations are facing an acute financial crisis.
For example, Jesse Helms in the U.S. Congress is waging a war to make
organizations like U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
obsolete. 4 The EC is redirecting its aid efforts towards Eastern Europe and
Chile, Argentina and Mexico, [because] this 'model' has obtained the blessing of the
World Bank and the IMF as desirable and thus satisfying their loan conditions." Rafael
A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America in The Shift in
Markets: New Movements in International Law Responding to Privatization, 87 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRo. 105, 128 (1993).
38. Id.
39. See generally Heilbroner, supra note 1.
40. Id. At the same time, many Third World countries, especially in Africa, collapsed
into ethnic anarchy. Some had been living on superpower support that has vanished.
Others had been experimenting with socialist economics that is now discredited. For
example, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia-have become post-Cold War headlines. Id.
41. " A consortium of AIDS organizations and 18 members of Congress are charging
that the U.S. Agency for International Development has fallen down on the job in overseas
AIDS prevention efforts. The agency, known as USAID, received $114 million this year
earmarked by Congress for prevention of AIDS overseas. In sharp letters this month to
President Clinton and USAID director Brian Atwood, the congressional critics charge that,
"USAID had not named a successor to head the Office of HIV / AIDS despite the fact that
the current director has effectively left the position. We are also concerned that while at
the beginning of this fiscal year USAID's HIV / AIDS Office had 12 staff members ... at
present, the staff has only three full-time staff members and no leadership. U.S. Rep.
Gary Ackerman (D-Bayside) is among the 18 members of the House and Senate who
signed the letter. And though USAID representatives told Newsday that they have every
intention of filling the vacant positions by mid-September, Ackerman said he remains
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is turning its back on its former colonies in the Third World.42 The World
Bank's major subscribers are asking for the consideration of retrenchment
policies within its programs also. Private commercial bank lending is still
recovering from the debt crisis and therefore is cautious about lending to
these countries.43 In sum, with sources of financial aid dwindling many
developing countries have been desperately seeking aid elsewhere.
But the "North" is nonetheless prescribing a new solution to these
economic woes, one which owes much more to Adam Smith than it does to
distressed. "We have a global pandemic on our hands. It affects everyone, everywhere.
And we are the scientific leader of the world, the medical leader, and the moral leader.
We have to show that we're committed. And by not appropriately staffing the
international office we are not doing our share, and we're sending a terrible signal to the
rest of the world." Due to the August vacation, agency director Atwood was not available
for comment. A spokesman for the agency said that although some of the positions had
gone unfilled for much of the fiscal year, USAID has every intention of filling the staff
load with top quality personnel, drawn primarily from elsewhere in the agency. USAID
is an agency grown accustomed to attack - but usually from the right. All aspects of
foreign AIDS spending had been questioned since the Republicans won control of
Congress in 1992, and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N. Carolina), now chairman of the powerful
Foreign Relations Committee, has openly question whether USAID ought to even exist."
Laurie Garrett, AIDS Controversy, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1996, at A19.
42. " Serious dangers for the Third World could arise as a result of the new East-West
accord, Mr. Tony Benn warned. The former Labour Cabinet minister, addressing a
conference organized by the British Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization at the the London
Park Hotel, said that the non-aligned movement had always campaigned actively for co-
existence, disarmament and development. "The easing of the risk of nuclear war
represents a great achievement for them. But we have to face the fact that new and serious
dangers could arise as a by-product of this East-West accord." He said the risks included:
money now coming to Third World countries, whether as aid or commercial investment,
could be diverted to the USSR or eastern Europe by western governments. The move
towards market economies in former communist countries may weaken their historic
commitment to Third World nations. Arrangements being negotiated between
Washington, Moscow and Brussels could lead to a superpower carve-up depriving the
Third World of political support. The re-unification of Germany, the adoption of a world
role for Nato and the growing federalization in the EC could reassert a white European
domination of the world. Such developments could undermine liberation and popular
movements in every continent, weaken the development process and freeze the majority
of the world's population in poverty. Mr. Benn, MP for Chesterfield, said: "If these
dangers, which also threaten working people in America, the USSR and Europe are to be
avoided we shall have to build an international network of cooperation among all those,
in every country, who want peace, democracy, social justice and development." Chris
Moncrieff, Benn Warns of Dangers for Third World, TiE PRESS ASSOCIATION LIMITED,
Aug 1, 1990.
43. LDC external financing from commercial bank lending has fallen from 46% in 1989
to only 17% in 1991. Cook & Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 15.
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Marx or even Keynes: the old Adam Smith solution of the market. To
understand the privatization trend it must be understood in its proper
ideological framework. International donor agencies are increasingly
rejecting all forms of economic planning and other forms of government
intervention in favor of market forces." In the United States, the Reagan
Administration made an early determination to utilize American foreign aid
to bolster the role of the private sector in least developed countries, an issue
which was underlined in the Cancun Conference in 198 1." Accordingly,
USAID has been reorienting the disbursement of its funds. In 1985
Secretary of State George Shultz instructed all USAID missions abroad to
46give priority to privatization in discussions with host governments.
Pressure from multilateral agencies not withstanding, many developing
country governments have increasingly given a receptive ear to the
possibility of stimulating growth through the promotion of the private sector
instead of the public sector."7 The appeal of privatizations in the developing
world cannot however be divorced from the previous hopes and experiences
that fueled the great economic development ideologies of the past. As one
African economist cautioned, "Privatization is kin to such more-or-less
discredited prot6g6s of the search for economic growth as 'import
substitution', 'export promotion', 'export processing zones', and their
numerous off-shoots, including foreign investment promotions, structural
adjustments, and counter reactionary and nationalist policies such as
'indiginization'.... The current trend toward privatization expresses the
belief that a dead end has been reached in one direction, and the other road
must be taken."'48 Much attention needs to be directed to this fact.
Privatization programs are being implemented in failed economies. It is
important to remember that the inability of any type of structural reform to
address the pressing needs of these economies can be just as easily
44. Werner Baer & Melissa Birch, Privatization and the Changing Role of the State in
Latin America, 25 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 14-15 (1992).
45. Young, supra note 23, at 164.
46. Id. at 167.
47. See S.E.L.A. Promotes Cooperative Regional Efforts to Improve Privatization
Programs in Latin America, CHRONICLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Apr.
6, 1995 (Reviewing the wave of privatizations in the region and recognizing that "the
public benefits from privatization programs ... have been mixed ... and it is still too early
to assess the real impact of [these programs"). See also Scott West, Caribbean-Economy:
Privatization Still High on Regional Agenda, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 1995
(Reporting on Caribbean governments increased responsiveness to privatization).
48. Chibundu, supra note 27, at 120.
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discarded as the previous ones. 49
Staunch neo-liberal advocates would explain the need for privatization
programs in this manner: Just as structural adjustment programs have been
aimed to remove acts of governments that "artificially" interfered with the
free markets more efficient means of allocating resources, privatization
policies aim at removing state interference in the economic production of
countries so that resources can be more "efficiently" allocated and the
effects of this will "trickle-down" and translate into improved economic
growth for all. The negative effects of structural adjustment programs can
be compensated for by the injection of new capital brought by foreign direct
investment. Obviously, this makes for a "neat" analysis, but must be
subject to further scrutiny.
But how does this ideology effectively translate into the economic
development needs of developing countries? What does privatization
actually mean to developing countries? What should it mean? This paper
will by no means discuss the merits of the differing economic ideologies,
but will attempt to highlight the particular constraints faced by developing
countries, within this neo-liberal ideological framework. Does divestment
serve as the proper stimulus to increasing private enterprise, particularly in
small, developing economies? If we are assuming that promotion of
increased private sector activity is the more efficient means toward
achieving sustained economic growth, how can the individual countries in
concert with the lender agencies fulfill this objective? Have previous
attempts worked? Can the proper legal infrastructures compensate for the
economic and political constraints faced by these nations? Obviously, one
can pose many questions, but can a changing legal and economic policy
49. For a general discussion on the cyclical nature of waves of privatizations followed
by nationalizations in the developing world, see Amy Chua, The Privatization-
Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1995) (Chua indeed forces us to take note of an important
distinction between the fervor for free-market ideologies in the developing countries and
that in the former socialist countries. She cautions that the excitement over the so-called
triumph of free-market policies over socialism due to the fall of the socialist regimes must
be tempered when addressing the concerns of the former because the non-socialist
developing world has had a long-time distrustful relationship with the free market. She
stresses that developing nations' experience with free-market ideologies go back very far,
and in contrast to the previously socialist republics, have been functioning within the
framework of traditional market economies. She explains that in these nations there has
been a cyclical behavior between projectionist measures often responding to strong
populist pressures to redress imperfections of the market and a strong inclination towards
laissez-faire policies. She describes what she perceives as a cycle between privatization
and nationalization in a variety of developing countries and predicts a swing of the
pendulum if the root causes of this cycle are not properly addressed).
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provide the answer?
IV. DEVELOPING THE PERIPHERY-HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE
STATE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
An effective evaluation of privatization programs in the developing
world cannot proceed without a thorough understanding of the historical
role of the state in these countries.
The history of most developing countries begins with a similar colonial
legacy. 5°  In general, economic policies during colonial eras were
characterized by heavy mercantilist trade with the colonizers. Primary
products from the colonies were exported to the western world to help fuel
the industrial development of these latter countries." Therefore, most of
the large scale investments in these countries were centered around heavy
extractive industries and large agricultural plantations producing primary
crops for export .5  For the most part, depending on the date of
independence, these trade patterns and likewise a reigning free-trade era
continued even after independence. 3 In addition, in many countries the
extractive industries and agricultural commodity export industries remained
in foreign hands after independence. 54 In times of favorable commodity
50. Much of the following discussion will be general, but examples will be drawn
particularly from the experiences of Latin America and the Caribbean.
51. For a discussion of the colonial trade patterns in the Americas as the source of
wealth for European development see generally E. Bradford Burns, Latin America: A
Concise Interpretative History 18, 110-19, 128-33, 147-51 (1972). See also LINDA
NEWSON, The Latin American Colonial Experience, in LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT:
GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 7 (David Preston ed., 1987).
52. Economists like J.S. Mill stressed that most of the foreign investment in these
countries were set up primarily to serve the needs of the advanced economies and thus
explained why most of these investments were centered around extractive industries which
catered principally to industrial markets. 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, BOOK III, 256-58 (1972).
53. In fact, in most Latin-American countries (which gained their independence much
earlier than developing countries in other regions of the world), the post colonial period
in the nineteenth century was marked by extreme liberalism in political and especially
economic policy. Post-revolutionary constitutions and codes emphasized the separation
of powers, equality, individual rights and free market competition. See Enrique R.
Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards Communal
Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 222-23 (1994).
54. Most of the English-speaking Caribbean had not gained their independence until the
1960s and these colonial trade patterns persisted after independence. These nations
continued to depend on the exportation of primary agricultural products like sugar, coffee,
and bananas. For the most part, these agricultural enterprises for export remained in
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prices many of these countries recorded steady economic growth.55
However, dependence on primary commodities proved to be too fickle, and
increased dependence on the import of manufactured goods from the
developed nations forced the developing state governments to increasingly
view their role as industrial development promoters in an effort to confront
the systemic disadvantages their countries faced in the global trading
system.
5 6
In respect to this governmental intervention, Latin American
governments led the way after World War II when many began to take an
active role in the industrial development of their countries." Realizing the
growing gap between themselves and their former colonists, Latin American
governments sought to promote industrial development through import
substitution policies.5" These policies were influenced by economists who
belonged to the "structuralist school" of international trade.59 They
believed there was a structural bias in the global trading system against
foreign hands after independence. Haiti's unique historical experience of early
independence obtained by the first successful slave revolt in the world served to preclude
extensive foreign ownership particularly in the primary agricultural commodity sector.
Since its independence, the Haitian constitution severely restricted foreign ownership of
property. Nonetheless foreign ownership and control have been the reality in other key
sectors. For example, the United States Reynolds Mining Company had a monopoly on
Haitian bauxite mining. See MICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT, HAITI: STATE AGAINST NATION:
THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF DUVALIERISM 202 (1990).
55. For example, Jamaica, between 1965 and 1970 recorded an average growth rate of
5 % per annum when primary commodity prices were quite high. ADAM ET AL., supra
note 2, at 107.
56. " The nineteenth century 'colonial' pattern of trade relations had been typified by
a division of labor which prevented the industrial development of the South. The largely
industrialized colonial powers had no interest in developing competing industries in their
colonial possessions, thus they tapped their colonies as a source of primary commodities.
This, in effect, relegated these developing areas to a peripheral role in the economies of
their colonizing powers." Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International
Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 357-58 (1994).
57. See generally Baer & Birch, supra note 44. Jamaica's market capitalization has risen
from 2% in 1980 to 24.6% in 1989. See ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 83 tbl.5.4.
The number of listed companies in Jamaica grew from 38 in 1980 to 449 in 1990. See id.
at 84 tbl.5.6. Trinidad and Tobago recorded an average growth rate of 7 % between 1976
and 1982. See id. at 177. Malaysia had real GDP growth rates of 5.3%, 8.7%, and 7.6%
for the years 1987-1989 respectively. See id. at 211. By 1983 in Papua, New Guinea real
growth average around 5%. See id. at 273. In Kenya: real GDP growth averaged 6.6%
per annum between 1963-1973. See id. at 323.
58. Baer & Birch, supra note 44, at 3.
59. Carrasco, supra note 53, at 231.
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developing countries that exported primary commodities. The structuralists
rejected the assumption that the international divisions of labor based on
comparative advantage would yield an equitable distribution of benefits
between developing and developed countries. They emphasized the
importance of trade to economic development but argued that "instead of
exporting primary goods, the state should supervise a process of
industrialization through backward linkages, starting with light industry and
concluding with capital goods production. "6
Consistent with these theories, the governments of developing
countries increasingly adopted policies to reorder the economic resources
in order to drive internal industrial development. Financial regulatory
regimes such as high tariffs and non-tariff barriers and strong central bank
regulation were set up to protect incipient industries. 6 These ideas gained
widespread acceptance even in the smaller economies in the Caribbean. In
the latter countries industrialization promotion policies were formulated
primarily to diversify their export sectors.62 These countries wished to
reduce their extreme dependence on a few traditional export crops and
primary commodities. In response, industrialization in the Caribbean
largely assumed the form of local assembly or packaging of goods
previously imported.63 Bilateral trade agreements like the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, which served to spur foreign assembly plants in the Caribbean to
take advantage of low labor costs, gave the development of export-assembly
industries some momentum.' The Caribbean nations in turn were
permitted increased access to U.S. markets. This type of industrialization
which sought the input of foreign investors was termed "industrialization by
invitation. "65
60. Id. at 224.
61. Id. at 229-30.
62. Limitations such as the small size of domestic markets and the limited purchasing
power of domestic consumers provided some limitations to import substitution strategies
in the Caribbean. Many chose to adopt export promotion industrialization policies instead.
See HOWARD, supra note 28, at 154.
63. RAMESH F. RAMSARAN, THE CHALLENGE OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 26 (1992)
64. For a thorough discussion on the merits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in
the promotion of trade opportunities for the Caricom nations see generally Mark B. Baker
& Jaime E.Toro-Monserrate, CBI v. Caricom: The Interplay Between Two International
Law Instruments, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (1986). See also James E. Stamps,
Caribbean Basin Initiative: Ten Years of Trade Preference, 3 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y.
149 (1994).
65. The role of foreign investment during these periods of industrialization continued
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State governments first increased their participation in the market by
becoming regulators of economic incentives. Governments offered liberal
tax incentives to attract investors and likewise increased public expenditures
to build the necessary infrastructure conducive to the diversification of other
investment sectors.' In addition, driven by the underdevelopment of
private financial institutions, state governments became heavily involved in
the financial sectors in their economies.67
A. Governments Compensate for Lack of Private Capital
Besides restructuring the macroeconomic framework to reorient
economic resources and investment incentives, many developing country
governments felt a need to take a more direct role in stimulating industrial
development. In response, the State often directly invested in the import-
substitution/export promotion industries as well as the infrastructure and
public works necessary to spur continued industrial investments.' For the
most part, the State was substituting for a lack of local private capital. 69
These governments were influenced by economic theories of development
which stressed again a structural bias against developing countries in their
access to capital. These theories advanced that underdeveloped countries
lacked certain prerequisites conducive to the attraction of the private capital
investment needed for industrialization. The inducement to invest was
limited by the size of the domestic markets in these countries. The size of
to be important. For example, in the Caribbean most development plans placed a heavy
emphasis on the promotion of foreign investment in the pursuit of import substitution and
export promotion strategies. See HowARD, supra note 28, at 153-54.
66. Carrasco, supra note 53, at 227-45.
67. Id. at 239-45.
68. Id. Structural economists encouraged these types of activities. Economist Raul
Prebisch submitted a paper to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) where he wrote, "It became clear that, given the external trade
crisis... the substitution of manufacturing imports required an enormous effort, as well as
the mobilization of domestic and external resources. The items required included
financing, new industrial facilities-especially in infrastructure and basic sectors such as
electric power, fuel, and intermediate and capital goods-plus entrepreneurial and
technical skills, which were., scarce... Not surprisingly, therefore, a clear political
consensus emerged that the State should expand the scope of its responsibilities by
engaging in the support of production, and that it should involve itself directly in business
activity..(emphasis added)." See Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin
America and Its Principal Problems, U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America,
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 12/89/Rev. 1 (1950).
69. Baer & Birch, supra note 44, at 5.
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the markets conducive to attracting private capital for industrialization was
limited due to the general low level of income and productivity
characteristic of most underdeveloped economies.7' Again, structural
economists were cognizant of the pattern of capital formation in the global
economy. Capital begat capital. Just as these countries suffered a structural
imbalance within the world trade order, they also found themselves on the
periphery of capital investment decisions. As was previously explained,
capital investment in the developing world had primarily been concentrated
in the extractive and export industries which could serve the capital
necessities of the industrialized markets. 71 However, this type of capital
investment flow did not do much to develop the productivity and domestic
economies of these countries. It was perceived that as long as domestic
productivity was not stimulated, most of the external economies and savings
generated by these types of investments would continue to encourage the
flow of capital from the poorer nations to the richer ones. To affect this
perverse cycle, developing countries needed to stimulate domestic
investment activities that would aim at making their domestic markets
attractive to private capital.
Several development economists surmised that as a result of the low
incomes of the general populations in these economies, private investors
shunned business opportunities that these economists felt could otherwise
be attractive provided the marginal productivity of capital were being
stimulated elsewhere in the economy. The basic thrust was to break the
cycle of underdevelopment by having the state invest in a wide range of
industries simultaneously in an effort to overcome the impediments to
private capital.72 These investments would enlarge the domestic market and
70. Ragnar Nurkse described this cycle in these terms, "... the inducement to invest
may be low because of the small buying power of the people, which is due to their small
real income, which atain is due to low productivity. The low level of productivity,
however, is a result of the small amount of capital used in production, which in its turn
may be caused at least partly by the small inducement to invest." RAGNAR NURKSE,
PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 5 (1958).
71. Since the 1950s these 'traditional' types of foreign investment were deplored for
their effect of impeding the economic development of the underdeveloped nations who
were the hosts of these investments. See generally H.W. Singer, The Distribution of Gains
between Investing and Borrowing Countries, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, PAPERS
AND PROCEEDINGS, (James W. Bell & Gertrude Tait eds., May 1950). See also NURKSE,
supra note 70, at 24. (describing Dr. H. W. Singer's criticisms, "According to him,
foreign investment was foreign only in a geographic sense; it formed essentially a part of
the creditor country's economy; it did little or nothing to promote-and, on occasion, may
even have impeded-the economic development of the debtor countries.")
72. Nurkse was an advocate of the balanced-growth theory "The external economies
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stimulate productivity so that these markets would attract more private
capital investments. Thus, where states perceived a lack of private capital
they caused state sectors to invest directly in all types of productive
industries, particularly in large scale investments. These investments
(which did not result from the private investment decisions of business
entrepreneurs) might be termed "autonomous" investments.73 The capital
for these investments was derived from states' ability to capture domestic
savings through taxation or its ability to attract foreign capital through loans
from commercial and/or multi-lateral development banks. In fact the
policies of these donor agencies actually fueled the growth of state sectors
in the developing world. Multilaterals as well as private commercial banks
often preferred the guarantees offered by national governments and found
it very risky to guarantee loans to national private entities.74 Therefore, it
became much easier for the state to obtain the necessary capital than it was
for local private interests.
B. Political and Social Pressures Force Governments to Take Control of
the "Commanding Heights" of the Economy-Regulation and
Nationalizations
The aforementioned periods of forced industrialization did for the most
part result in steady (if not impressive) growth rates. For example, the
Latin American economies (in GDP) grew at annual real rates of 5.4% in
the 1960s and 5.9% in the 1970s.75 During the same period the number and
size of public enterprises in many Latin American countries also grew
significantly.76 However, the benefits of these induced economic growth
in the market sense, just like those of the more conventional type, can create a discrepancy
between the private and the social marginal productivity of capital. The private
inducement to invest in any single project may be quite inadequate because of the market
difficulty, even where the marginal productivity of capital applied over a range of
complementary industries.., is very considerable. This is why a wave of new investments
in different branches of production can economically succeed, enlarge the total market
and so break the bonds of the stationary equilibrium of underdevelopment." NURKSE,
supra note 70, at 15.
73. " Autonomous" investments are capital outlays from public authorities. This type
of investment does not depend on market demand. 1d. at 29.
74. Tom J. Farer, "Privatization as an International Phenomenon", in The Shift in
Markets: New Movements in International Law Responding to Privatization, 87 AM.
SOC'Y. INT'L L. PROC. 105, 106 (1993).
75. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN
LATIN AMERICA 4 tbl.2 (1991).
76. Baer & Birch, supra note 44, at 4.
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policies failed to translate into increased incomes for the majority of the
population." In fact, these growth rates were highly unbalanced and
resulted in extreme disparities in income. As a consequence, social and
political crises erupted that demanded increased government intervention.78
As a result, these governments soon began to view their role as
industrial/economic development promoters as well as income
redistributors. In response, many sought to gain increased control over the
profits generated by their productive economic sectors. This was
effectuated either through increased regulation or the outright nationalization
of industries. In sum, the nationalizations that took place in many
developing countries were a reaction to internal political pressures exerted
by large factions of the population which felt unaffected by the economic
growth of some leading sectors.79 Waves of nationalism were able to take
hold in these countries as populations demanded greater local involvement
in the economy. 0 For example, nationalizations which took place in the
Caribbean in the 70s were an effort to assume greater control over the
production of income in these countries. Foreign-asset holdings were
particularly affected by nationalization policies. For example, the 1960s
were a period of relative economic growth for Jamaica. The country was
still benefiting from favorable agricultural prices, there was a strong market
for bauxite, and tourism was relatively strong."s There was also a moderate
increase in non-tradable manufacturing. However, this decade was a period
marked by increasing unemployment and sustained disparities of income.82
It was these problems which contributed to the ushering in of the Manley
government in 1972-a government which had a far more socialist
orientation than its predecessors." Consequently, this government
proceeded to take over a large number of foreign owned enterprises in order
77. Carrasco, supra note 53, at 228-29. The industrialization policies were based on
a top-down approach to development. The policies favored the protection of capital
intensive.
78. Id. at 246.
79. For a discussion of the waves of nationalizations which took place throughout the
developing world see generally Chua, supra note 49. (Chua argues that it is primarily the
economic income disparities that have in many instances fomented waves of Nationalism
throughout the developing world. Nationalist movements and their subsequent reform, she
states, stem directly from the failure of the market economy to properly incorporate
growing economic sectors.)
80. RAMSARAN, supra note 63, at 88.
81. ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 107-08.
82. Id. at 108.
83. Id.
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to have greater control over the "commanding heights" of the economy.84
The redistributing benefits attempted by state governments and the
"complementing" intentions of state government industrial policies were
soon outweighed by extensive costs to the respective economies. Increased
state participation in economic sectors lead to structural economic
imbalances that resulted in a pervasive hindrance to economic growth.8 5
Increased state intrusion began to express itself in persistent budget deficits
and increasing negative external debt balances .86
Unfortunately, the state sector proved in most cases to be highly
inefficient. There are several explanations for this. Generally, once the
state assumed its function as macroeconomic regulator, its social and
political objectives could not help but to interfere with the microeconomic
efficiency goals of the economic enterprises of which it maintained
control.' Not surprisingly, many social as well as economic goals of the
government were enmeshed in the decision-making apparatus of these
SOEs. The role of the government in what ideally should be purely
economic decisions opened the door for political interference, corruption,
and poor performance in the delivery of basic services and essential
inputs.88 As a consequence these governments soon found themselves
engaging in wasteful financial activities in order to continue funding these
enterprises. State enterprises which were functioning with consistent
deficits were kept running through funding from other government
sources-funds which could have been used to sponsor other direct social
programs. In turn the external debt balances particularly increased as
governments continued to borrow to finance their various social programs.
Thus, by the late seventies and early eighties most developing economies
found themselves facing, in addition to persistent internal fiscal imbalances,
a strain on the external balance of payments with rising debt responsibilities.
These practices not only took a major toll on the general economy, but
more importantly also had the counterproductive effect of crowding out
domestic private sectors. Funds and investment savings that could have
been available to the private sector were tied up in state enterprises and thus
were either unavailable or priced too high.
84. Id. at 110. Some of the industries nationalized under Michael Manley's government
include the Bauxite mining industry, Aluminum, Petroleum, Cement, and Sugar
plantations. Barclay's Bank was also nationalized. Id. at 111.
85. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 33-50.
86. Id. at 41-50.
87. See generally id. at 33-35.
88. Id.
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Thus, to the extent that state governments sought to increase state
interference to redress economic disparities, the economic distortions
persisted and in many cases resulted in failed experiments in social reform.
The downward cycle had begun in earnest.
C. Period of Structural Adjustment Reforms
The pressures for economic reforms soon came from many sectors.
Concerned about future debt payments from these state governments which
had extensively borrowed, and realizing that projects funded would fail
where poor macro-economic policies existed, the multilateral lender
organizations increasingly began attaching economic structural reform
measures to future loan disbursements. 89 In many instances pressures for
reform also emanated from emerging economic classes in these countries
which felt frustrated by the crowding out effect of the heavy state presence
in economic sectors. 9 Therefore, in a sense, the emerging middle class in
many countries indirectly pressured state governments into restructuring
their activities.
In most developing countries the move to privatize public-owned
sectors are an integral part of general economic restructuring.9" Indeed,
structural adjustment programs promoted by multilaterals tend to be quite
uniform from country to country. Generally, they all aim at reducing
persistent budget deficits, alleviating the drain on foreign exchange
reserves, and reducing external debt and internal mismanagement. 2 The
macroeconomic reforms implemented to achieve these objectives include the
encouragement of liberal monetary policies and the elimination of protective
trade policies aimed at reducing the distortion in prices, the reduction of
both current and capital expenditures, and increased taxation.93 However,
such programs have generally had devastating effects on developing
economies. In fact, most developing countries have tried desperately to
avoid having to implement these programs and only a handful have managed
to avoid them.94 Therefore, any economic reform must be sensitive to the
89. See generally Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of
World Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 349 (1992).
90. For instance, State-owned enterprises often capture a disproportionate share of
credit, squeezing out private sector borrowing. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 51.
91. ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 75.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. Some countries like Kenya have managed to survive without signing on to some
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pain such reform invariably causes.
V. ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS FACING PRIVATIZATION
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Ironically, the aforementioned stabilization programs often present the
first major economic impediment to the success of privatization programs
in the developing world. Whereas the goal of privatizing is to induce
greater private investment, the stabilization effects often actually serve as
a discouragement to investment. 95  When a country embarks on a
macroeconomic stabilization program the policies it adopts have the effect
of inducing domestic contraction. 96 For example, tight fiscal and monetary
policies have the effect of reducing domestic consumption of which
investment is an important component. "Furthermore real interest rates are
targeted to increase with a view to reversing previous overcapitalistic
practices and lowering the capital-output ratio, which results in a direct
hindrance to capital accumulation and investment." 97 Many economists
agree that investment tends to react more markedly to consumption than to
contraction.98 Economic stabilization exerts a direct negative impact on
investment and national savings. In addition, the price of imported capital
goods following devaluation goes up, thereby making it more expensive to
develop investment projects needing foreign capital inputs. 99
Indeed, much of the experience with structural adjustment programs
has not been positive. Generally these adjustments have exerted on the
whole, no discernible positive effect on the overall rate of growth. 100 In
fact, the general experience of countries which have adopted these programs
of these programs. Others like Jamaica, tried to avoid them throughout the beginning
stages of its restructuring period in the 1980's but were forced to sign on in 1991. Id.
95. Fontaine & Geronimi, supra note 29, at 140.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 141.
98. See generally Pradeep K, Mitra, Adjustment to External Shocks in Selected Semi-
Industrial Countries 1974-1981, in STUDIES IN BANKING & FINANCE 231 (Piero Ferri &
Giorgio Rugazzi eds., Volume 4 1986).
99. Some economists have countered this by explaining that even in a depressed home
market, investments can be stimulated by an expansion of exports, or by prospects of
"efficient import substitution." Many economists also point to the fact that investors might
react positively to the increased efficiency brought by the structural reforms, a theory
termed "rationalization" investments. But these types of positive occurrences have
generally been rare. Fontaine & Geronimi, supra note 29, at 141.
100. RAMSARAN, supra note 63, at 5.
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continue to show a decline in average growth rates. For example, between
1980 and 1985, real output in Africa declined by an average of almost 1 %
as compared to a growth rate of over 4% between 1970 and 1979. 101 In
Latin America and the Caribbean, the experience is similar. Over the same
1980-87 period the rate of decline in real per capita income was 2.3 % in
Venezuela, 1.8% in Chile, 1.1% in Peru, 1.6% in Mexico, 2.5% in
Jamaica, and as high as 6.8% in Guyana, and 6.4% in Trinidad and
Tobago. 0 2 In addition, net flows of private capital also declined during
stabilization periods. The United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development in a study examining the effects of structural adjustment
programs found that private capital flows declined in non-petroleum
exporting developing countries from seventy billion dollars (US$) in
1979-1981 to barely twenty-eight billion dollars in 1985-1986. 103
It appears that the only economies which had a positive reaction to the
constraints brought by structural adjustment reforms were those which
already had viable industries which could take advantage of some of the
effects of the stabilization policies. For instance, it has been found that
countries which had already developed a strong manufacturing sector in
tradeable goods fared better after such reforms, as they were able to take
advantage of the currency depreciations induced by some of the government
measures. 04 Such an occurrence would only be prevalent in countries
which had already successfully developed a strong manufacturing sector
with large export markets. 105 The impact of stabilization on investments is
especially important in a discussion of privatization programs if the intent
behind such programs is actually to stimulate private investment to serve as
the primary engine of economic growth.
A. The Nature of Markets in Developing Countries:
The Lack of Competitive Markets
The private sector's inability to effectively invest in the economy has
its most deleterious effect when it is consequently unable to create the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Dharam Ghai, Structural Adjustment, Global Integration and Social Democracy,
DISCUSSION PAPER, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
(UNRISD) 4 (October 1992).
104. For a thorough discussion of the effects of the stabilization policies on investment
see generally, Benjamin, N.C., What Happens to Investment under Structural Adjustment:
Results from a Simulation Model, 20 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 9.
105. See generally Ghai, supra note 103.
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strong competitive market economy necessary for the short and long-term
success of privatization programs. The prevailing wisdom is that the
private sector is assumed to be more efficient both operationally and
allocatively when it is operating in a competitive market. 10 Thus, one of
the most important determinants of how privatization programs will fare in
developing countries is the extent to which they have developed mature
competitive markets and strong private sectors prior to privatization. 107
Unfortunately, the greatest impediment to the success of privatization
efforts in developing countries is the lack of competitive markets in these
economies and the existence of a small private sector incapable of
effectively replacing the public sector. 10 The market structure prevalent in
many developing countries often presents a distinct set of impediments
towards the success of market-based reforms in general. "0 For one, the
public sector in most developing countries are usually operating in
highly-concentrated sectors. l l  This is in part a direct result of the
industrialization policies previously adopted.'' In many areas where the
state has invested, the state usually enjoys monopolistic control over the
106. Adam, Cavendish, & Mistry argue that "though market liberalization and the
promotion of competition are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for privatization,
they are often closely linked. The link occurs because a chief determinant of information
costs is the degree of competitiveness in the market. Competition generates information
and lowers its cost for the owners of firms in the market.." See ADAM ET AL., supra note
2, at 17. The desirability for privatization is to attain a more efficient allocation of
resources as well as more efficient operation. However, to attain this the proper incentives
have to be in place. Competition amongst private companies is what forces private entities
to be efficient.
107. The nature of the market, the structure of the public enterprises, and the
development of capital markets have been the ultimate determinant of the pace and
structure of privatization in developing countries over the longer term and therefore
"determine the fundamental value of privatization in such economies." Adams,
Cavendish, & Mistry report that large, more diversified economies have generally fared
better after privatization than low income, narrow-base economies. Id. at 70.
108. The markets in many developing countries, particularly in LDCs are usually
dominated by a large public sector and/or foreign-enterprises which account for most of
the output and a small number of family operated enterprises. Id. at 72.
109. Michael Todaro posits, "... Third world economies are so different in structure
and organization from their Western counterparts that the behavioral assumptions and
policy precepts of traditional neoclassical theory are sometimes questionable and often
incorrect. Competitive markets simply do not exist, nor ... would they necessarily be
desirable ... " MICHAEL TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 87 (5th ed. 1994).
110. ADAM ET AL, supra note 2, at 72.
111. Id.
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sector and or industry. 12 Historically, states invested in natural monopolies
(public utilities for example) or invested in productive sectors where initially
there was a lack of private investment. 113 Further, many instances of
nationalization took place in industries where foreign investors had also
enjoyed monopoly positions. 4 As a result, in most developing countries
the state continues to enjoy vast market dominance with extreme monopoly
control in important economic sectors. 5
With the retrenchment of the public sector in productive areas of the
economy, there needs to be a supply of private investors to replace the
government sector. 16 Unfortunately, in economies where the public sector
managed to effectively "crowd-out" private investment, the indigenous
private sector usually is incapable of participating fully in the privatization
programs. "17 Consequently private sector is unable to create and maintain
a dynamic competitive market in the previously publicly-owned enterprises
and industries.
The lack of a solid private sector foundation is often overlooked by the
promoters of private sector reforms. In many developing countries the
private sector usually functions in an environment that tends to be inherently
anti-competitive. For one, the private sector, particularly in smaller
economies tends to be extremely concentrated and oligopolistic. 11' There
are a number of factors that create concentrated private sectors. For
example, particularly in smaller economies, the lack of access to larger
markets will tend to restrain the opportunity to enlarge private sector
activities." 9 In addition, business relationships in the private sector are
112. Id.
113. See infra pp. 16-21.
114. We have seen how the existence of foreign monopolies were responsible for
stimulating the growth of the state-owned enterprises in the first place. State intervention
was justified on the grounds that these monopoly profits needed to be distributed
domestically. This has been the justification for the nationalizations for example in
Jamaica in 1972, and Mexico in the early 1980s.
115. In smaller economies the bulk of the large industries has generally been either state
or foreign-owned. In the smaller economies of the Caribbean for instance, State
dominance in all types of sectors were quite widespread. Not only did governments
operate in sectors like transport, energy, communication, and finance sectors, but the state
operated also in traditionally more competitive sectors, such as manufacturing, agriculture
and all types of services. ADAM ET AL, supra note 2, at 73.
116. See generally, Cook & Kirkpatrick, supra note 3.
117. Id at 3.
118. ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 72.
119. Francisco E. Thoumi in a description of privatization efforts in the Dominican
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often a reflection of traditional power relationships, both economic and
social, that are not often conducive to the expansion of the private investor
class. 20 Moreover, often the principal role of the public sector has been
to grant certain economic privileges to a small private sector.'2 ' In addition,
these oligopolistic private sectors are usually the only domestic investors
capable of participating in the privatization process. 122 There is a network
of privied economic and political relationships that results in a market
structure where it is very difficult to create the type of competitive markets
envisaged by neoclassical economists, that is, markets that take care of
themselves without outside interference.
VI. WHY THE CONCERN OVER POST PRIVATIZATION COMPETITION?
There is much concern over post-privatization competition for two
reasons. First, whenever there is a mere conversion of a public monopoly
into a private one, the efficiency gains of privatization most likely will be
transferred into increased economic rent for the private monopolizer and
thus even the macroeconomic efficiency gains expected to result from
privatizing the economy will be lost. 2 3 Second, divestment of monopolistic
state-owned enterprises by itself will do little to liberalize the economy and
Republic, Trinidad and Tobago cites the following reasons for weak private sectors: 1)
small size of markets; 2) personalized nature of economic relations; 3) special
characteristics of traditional economic power structures and political systems; 4) historical
role of government. Francisco E. Thoumi, International Center for Economic Growth, in
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 102-03 (William Glade ed.
1991).
120. For example Thoumi explains that "... a tradition of authoritarian rule has
influenced the [Dominican Republic's] market system's operation .... Il]mportant
entrepreneurial activities were exercised as if they were privileges granted by executive
power." Id. at 101.
121. A perfect example of this special relationship between political governments and
business sectors is in the adoption of import-substitution policies. In many cases, in order
for these policies to succeed these industries had to be highly protected from foreign
competition. Likewise, many times the domestic markets could not sustain more than one
or two producers. The government would grant special licenses to a handful of private
entrepreneurs wherever it did not invest itself. Because of the highly-protected market,
those lucky enough to obtain these licenses would enjoy great monopoly profits due to the
vacuum of competition created by the protected markets. For a full description of these
types of policies in a least-developed nation see SIMON M. FASS, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN HAITI: THE DRAMA OF SURVIVAL 32-37 (1988).
122. Thoumi, supra note 120, at 103.
123. Douglas Webb, Privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean:Legal Issues, 87
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 105, 119 (1993).
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spur further private economic activity without the concurrent stimulation of
a vibrant efficient and competitive private sector. 124
A. Promoting Competition
There are two main privatization strategies which can aid in promoting
more competition. One is to aim at deconcentrating the relevant sector and
strengthening the competitive market prior to divestment. This includes any
measures taken by the government to encourage entry into an industry with
the government expecting a gradual retrenchment once the competitive
market is fostered. 125 The second strategy is for governments to strengthen
their regulatory roles in order to promote and enforce industry performance
regulations in sectors that are not conducive to competition. 1
26
The first strategy has been followed by China. Instead of the "shock
therapy" prescriptions adopted and preferred by the World Bank where
measures are taken to immediately privatize public sectors, China has
pursued a more gradual strategy. In highly concentrated public sectors
where the government wishes to privatize, the state has first encouraged the
creation of a competitive non-state sector prior to the divestment of the
public enterprises. 127 This is to assure that the "transfer of ownership from
state to private hands occurs in the context of an already highly-marketized
framework."1 28 Indeed, in many instances the government subsidized the
private entrepreneurs to provide them with the necessary capital and
expertise to get started in the industry or sector. 129 In some cases, simply
deregulating an industry that was highly protected might be sufficient to
induce indigenous private sector investment. 130
124. Id.
125. Examples of government policies aimed at deconcentrating economic sectors and
encouraging competitive markets: removing entry barriers, such as special licenses to
operate, the implementation and enforcement of competition law (this will be discussed
further in the next section), and opening the market up to foreign competition. Id.
126. It is noted that particularly in small economies, "... competition in many markets
is so weak that without appropriate regulation the hypothesized benefits of privatization
can be quickly dissipated through the creation and maintenance of monopoly profits."
ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 78.
127. See Cao, supra note 26, at 99-100.
128. Id. at 104.
129. Id. at 125, 132.
130. An example: The simultaneous privatization and deregulation of urban bus
transport systems in Jamaica was enough to create an efficient and competitive market.
Another example is the dividing up of state industries into smaller, viable investment
2591999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
In areas where the nature of the industry precludes the viability of a
competitive sector and where monopoly control is a given, the new role of
the state should be to strengthen performance regulations and competition
laws with privatization."'3 For example, in the case of natural monopolies
such as public utilities, governments transferring ownership should do so
only with the proper regulation controls to prevent the simple transfer of a
public monopoly to a private one. There are also some other commercial
activities where, due to the small domestic markets, the participation of
more than a handful of entrepreneurs is not feasible. Nonetheless,
governments should attempt to enforce the proper competition laws that will
enable it to prevent detrimental oligopolistic and monopolistic practices.
There has, unfortunately, been a lack of attention to these types of reforms
in most of the privatization programs. 132 In most developing countries such
industries are privatized without any type of regulatory framework for
controlling monopoly abuses. 133
Thus the oligopolistic nature of the public and private sectors dictate
that privatization and the liberalization of markets alone will not be
sufficient to realize efficiency gains without the design and enforcement of
effective regulation and competition policies. The irony is that the need for
regulation is greatest in economies which have the most limited capacity to
manage it effectively. 134 "It is noteworthy that the IMF and the World Bank
do not generally include restrictive business practices legislation in their
structural adjustment conditions. Indeed, there appears to be a presumption
by these agencies that competition between firms will result from various
types of economic reforms, such as trade liberalisation and deregulation of
markets rather than through legislative controls that prevent anti-competitive
behaviour. "131 One can argue that this prescription is ill-placed at best.
Some have countered that regulatory reforms can take place after the
transfer to the private sector. But this is unrealistic and dangerous. The
negotiation of these sales will certainly take into account the possibility of
increased government interference in the future and will directly affect the
units, such as the sale of lands or plantations, in the Caribbean, to smaller private
cultivators. ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 73.
131. In these industries competition will be lacking regardless of who owns or runs
them. Privatization per se will not affect the performance of these enterprises. Id. at 18-
19.
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attractiveness and sales price of the state divestments. Likewise, in the real
world, the purchaser will certainly negotiate assurances for minimal future
government interference, particularly in pressured sales. In addition if
regulation occurs after privatization instead of concurrently, these actions
may also stifle further investments.
B. Expanding Domestic Private Sectors
Regulation and attempts to create the proper competitive markets to
achieve higher efficiency is important, but in order for a country to achieve
sustained economic development and growth, a privatization program must
aim first and foremost at expanding its domestic private sector. As was
discussed briefly in the previous section, in the context of stimulating
competitive markets, there remains the need to remove barriers so that more
private players can compete in the market. But deregulation of markets
alone is not sufficient to expand a private sector.
Underlying a simple transfer of assets from the concentrated public to
the private sector presupposes the effectiveness of a trickle-down theory of
economic expansion. In private hands the enterprises should run more
efficiently and the economic savings should "trickle-down" to the rest of
the economy. Transferring previously public assets to private hands will
not solve the problems encountered by most developing countries with prior
uneven growth industrialization policies. Concern over the growth pattern
of the private sector should be of extreme importance, particularly in
developing economies where past economic growth has proceeded in a
highly unbalanced manner. 3 6 Many developing countries have experienced
skewed economic development patterns where small enclaves have enjoyed
the fruits of economic expansion. For example, we have seen how the
industrialization policies of the 60s and 70s resulted in skewed income
distribution as only a small sector was able to directly take part in the
industrialization efforts. To the extent that the sectors able to participate in
136. Many policy-makers have recommended four broad objectives for privatization
programs: 1) capital market development, 2) private sector development, 3) changing
income distribution, 4) alleviate government fiscal obligations. ADAM ET AL., supra note
2, at 99. Preferably the first three objectives should be considered together. Privatization
programs will tend to result in very concentrated wealth distributions unless special effort
is spent to expand the opportunities of privatization. Malaysia and Jamaica have instituted
privatization programs that have aimed at "sharing the riches" of privatization. Wider
public share sales have been a major feature in these countries' programs. Malaysia has
been particularly adamant about fulfilling an affirmative action program to make sure
underrepresented min6rities get their fair opportunity to own their fair share of the assets
up for sale. Id. at 53, 213-14.
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the privatization process remains restricted to a small group of people
(whether it be a handful of small private domestic investors or foreign
investors) the same problems presented by the industrialization policies of
the past will inevitably result. The efficiency gains of the restricted
privatization efforts will more likely not translate into increased incomes for
the population as a whole. With such an outcome privatization may well
become another "failed" policy which did not succeed in responding to the
development needs of a country. Thus it can be argued that successful
privatization programs will only be the ones capable of bringing more
people into the fold.
1. The Issue of Foreign Investment
When the domestic private sector finds itself unable to invest in its own
economy, countries will be in search of capital infusions from somewhere.
Inevitably, the foreign investment sector presents itself, uncrippled by the
domestic economic woes of the host countries and in many cases at a unique
economic advantage and bargaining position. 3 7 However, the developing
countries' past experiences with foreign investment only helps to foretell a
vicious cycle out of which true economic development for these countries
may be virtually impossible. Indeed, some countries have had to alter their
foreign investment codes to accommodate their new privatization programs.
However, the caution against foreign investment stems from the failure of
much of the foreign investment in the past to "trickle-down" and translate
itself into increased economic opportunities for the indigenous population.
Measures may be taken to force foreign investors to participate more
directly in the local economic development of these countries such as
controls over repatriation of profits, or increased regulatory control in
monopoly sectors. However, it is unrealistic to believe that foreign
investors would be willing to negotiate these deals. Developing countries
on the other hand are very reluctant to change their legislation and policies
137. The foreign sector has been a dominant player in most developing economies
where the private domestic sector has been small. Historically, the foreign sector has
injected capital into these economies either through public debt financing or through
foreign direct investment. Today the foreign sector is playing a dominant role in the
privatization process particularly in Africa and the Caribbean. Id. at 49-50. The foreign
investors do not face the constraints faced by the domestic private sector. For example,
the foreign sector usually finds its relative purchasing power improved in countries which
have embarked on structural adjustment programs. Id. at 75.
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restricting foreign investments. 138
VII. LACK OF EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS
The underdevelopment of capital markets in developing countries
makes it impossible to remedy the problem of industry concentration.
Ideally privatization should take place in an economy with a developed
capital market. A capital market's most attractive feature is that it permits
a large number of small buyers to participate in the economy. ' This is
attractive to a state government for it can aid in eliminating the various
barriers to flows of investment caused by the necessity for huge fixed
capital accumulation.' 4°  States can also minimize their reliance on
concentrated sources of investment and ideally involve greater numbers in
the privatization process. 141 Capital markets can thus help alleviate the
ownership concentration issues and can also provide the government with
greater alternatives for capital accumulation. These are very important
where income and asset distribution assumes a strong political dimension.
Even foreign participation is more acceptable where capital markets exist.
By tapping into a broader domestic capital base, and significantly, by
offering a market through which foreign investors' equity stakes can be
liquidated in the future, foreign participation in the privatization program
is facilitated and its worse effects attenuated. 
142
Capital markets also provide greater flexibility in the tradability of
assets and efficiency in markets. A well-functioning market also provides
the appropriate incentive and monitoring environments for continued
efficiency improvements after sale.
Unfortunately most of the privatization in developing countries have
had to be implemented outside of a functioning capital market.
143
138. Even though developing countries are increasingly facing the realities that they
must turn to foreign capital to buoy there economies, most countries are trying desperately
to maintain tight controls on foreign investment. Id. at 76.
139. Id. at 83.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 84.
142. In developing countries the most common means of investing in privatization
programs has been through foreign direct investment (FDI). The amount of direct
portfolio investments in LDCs has been quite limited. There has been some trading of
equity instruments in Latin America listed in international security markets. These have
been used mainly in the sale of Latin American telecommunications companies. Cook &
Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 14.
143. Id.
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Privatization programs should be conceived in view of building a
functioning and expanding capital market. " An example of such efforts is
in Jamaica which is only one of two countries in the Caribbean to have a
functioning capital market. 145 Jamaica has successfully been able to expand
its capital market in relation to its GNP. In 1980 market capitalization was
2% of GNP, by 1988 the percentage had risen to 25%.1 46
Viii. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 47 recognizes that
privatization does not benefit all people equally, and there are often losers,
at least in the short run, particularly when redundancies or giving of social
assets are the key to improving efficiency and competitiveness. The short
run social and political costs are often clearer than the long-run economic
benefits to the country, so many countries will hesitate to privatize. 148
In most developing countries, the short-run social and political costs
of implementing such programs can be quite devastating. The reality is that
the particular structures of most developing world economies such as
disparities in income, unbalanced growth between productive sectors, and
generally higher unemployment rates, frame an economic context far
144. Indeed many policy-makers have linked privatization as a means to expanding
small or non-existent capital markets. However, Adams, Cavendish, & Mistry warn that
one does not necessarily lead to another and a privatization program must be carefully
designed, taking all other market realities into account before such an effect can be
expected. See ADAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 23-24.
145. Trinidad & Tobago is the other Caribbean country. Id. at 83.
146. Id. at 84. Jamaica has been quite an impressive exception in this case. In Adams,
Cavendish, & Mistry's study of several privatization experiences in developing countries,
the trend has generally been that privatization did not necessarily lead to capital market
expansion. In the case of Jamaica, the privatization policy-makers made an exceptional
effort to introduce new instruments, players, and techniques into the capital market. Id.
at 84. For a thorough recounting of the steps taken by the government of Jamaica to
include more participants in the privatization efforts see id. at 107-175. These authors
explain that Jamaica introduced its program in an extremely politically tense atmosphere.
The governments primary concern was to make the process politically palatable by making
it benefit the greatest amount of sectors to gain the proper political fuel to see the program
through. For example, the government sold the most economically viable entities first,
and sold shares to employees at below-value prices. Some of the first companies involved
the capital market. See id. at 121-22.
147. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an advisory arm of the World Bank
Group which has worked to encourage and develop private enterprise throughout the
developing world.
148. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, supra note 36, at Preface.
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different than in the developed word. Privatization in the developed world
is perceived as simply a decision aimed almost purely at rendering a sector
more efficient. In the developing world, privatization programs are being
implemented as a means of restructuring the economy. Developing
countries must convince their polity not that these SOEs will perform more
efficiently in private hands, but that privatization is a means to the end of
a more responsive economic development strategy promising growth for
larger segments of the population. We have seen how pure economic
growth in restricted sectors historically have provoked social and political
unrest. Privatization cannot present these countries with another "trickle
down" theory of development where the efficiency gains are expected to
somehow translate into higher incomes for the majority. The stakes are
much higher in these countries and the time-frame under which the polities
expectations must be met is rather short. The perceived success of
privatization will be directly linked to the ability of the government
implementing these programs to respond to the more pressing needs of its
constituents.
Proponents of privatization have not been able to escape the economic
realities of the countries in which they decide to promote these programs.
Much effort has been expended by governments and donor agencies
involved in the process to render privatization and the adjustments
accompanying them more "palatable" to the respective societies and
relevant political sectors. Organizations like the IFC recognize that the
short-term, efficient goals of privatization are often sacrificed when
governments design these programs around political concerns, but
nonetheless have been forced to accept some of these accommodations. 149
Political objectives in privatization programs have ranged from achieving
"a wide shareholder distribution, targeting certain classes of buyers (and
excluding others, particularly foreigners), ensuing that enterprises do not
close, reducing budget deficits, raising money, and maintaining employment
and other social obligations. "150
Perhaps, the most effective accommodations in privatization programs
are efforts by governments to directly involve as many people in the
privatization process as possible. Efforts at achieving wide shareholder
distribution, such as employee share programs, or efforts aiming at
involving smaller investors in the process may help to broaden the appeal
of privatization programs. More importantly, these programs can help to
stimulate the private investment sector by tapping into the savings potential
149. Id. at 1.
150. Id.
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of a greater number of small investors. Unfortunately, such results are
attainable only when the entity being privatized promises to be a viable
economic entity.
VII. CONCLUSION
As it has been exposed throughout this paper, the developing
economies have no choice but to swallow the pills of reform imposed by the
Bretton Woods Institution and embark on a privatization process that many
economic theorists see as a panacea for economic growth. The International
Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank group, after defining the
World Bank's role as "to build commitment to privatization by dialogue
with government at the policy level," sees its own mandate as "to further
economic development by encouraging development by encouraging the
growth of productive private enterprise in the developing world. "
1 51
The debate over the success or the failure of privatization programs
usually centers around the respective roles of internal policies and external
factors in the economic crisis. To some critics the economic difficulties of
the developing countries stem from depressed commodity prices, lack of
developments in technology, rising import prices, high interest rates, high
fuel prices, increased protectionism in the industrial countries as well as
reduced capital flows. The proponents of privatization tend to put the blame
on badly conceived domestic policies in a variety of areas. The contributing
factors often cited are inept economic management and conception. In spite
of the different results in economic performance, international lending
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank continue to put heavy
emphasis on internal factors for these meager results and continue to insist
on the necessity to adopt reform measures and privatization as the sole
remedies for economic growth."5 '
It is becoming clear to many observers that the failure of many
privatization programs stems from direct links to the structural adjustment
measures and other IMF/WB packages which often contradict sound
economic principles of investment and growth. Critics have pointed out
some of those contradictions which are often built into the precepts dictated
by the international lenders. They point out that higher interest rates tend
to encourage higher savings and result in a better utilization of financial
resources; yet higher lending rates which tend to accompany higher deposit
rates may discourage investment. Moreover, a major aim of structural
151. Id. at Preface.
152. RAMSARAN, supra note 63, at 2.
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adjustment programs is to increase the productivity of the poor sectors of
the economy; yet subsidized interest rates to farmers and small business are
often prohibited (while subsidies to farmers in many developed economies
are still in effect).
Above all, it is wrong to assume that a given set of policies can be
applicable to all economies, regardless of their size, cultural patterns, trade
traditions, etc. In fact, responses to new measures are often conditioned by
experience and perception of present and future economic and political
developments. When higher savings can be realized, the propensity in risky
economic environments is to move funds abroad for more security and
higher rates of return.
More importantly, private enterprises are often too concerned with their
own narrow interests and neglect decaying social conditions which might
fuel political unrest, corrupt practices, tax evasions, emigration and even
violence, which in turn could result in economic instability and chaos.
Unfortunately, the importance of social cohesion and solidarity as a
determinant to the rate and sustainability of economic growth is too often
neglected in the drawing of privatization plans.
As even the United Nations Research Institute recognizes, the advent
of democratic regimes provides an opportunity to create social solidarity
and a natural consensus to face the challenges of crisis, adjustment and
economic growth. Ironically, just at a time when they are called upon to
play this creative role, states everywhere have watched not only the steady
diminution of the resources they control, but also of their sovereignty in
social and economic matters through internationalization of their economies
and societies. Power in these spheres has shifted towards transnational
enterprises, international financial agencies and a handful of industrialized
countries. The concentration of economic power, however, has not been
accompanied by a corresponding shift in their political and social
responsibilities for global welfare or in their accountability to the people of
the world. Therefore, it is time for popular ideology to be re-assessed and
replaced with a view towards acheiving goals consistent with the true needs
of the population of the developing world. Failure to do so may very well
mean that some years from now, critics will be able to point to privatization
as another chapter of failure in the history of the lesser developed world.
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